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The optimal ination tax is reexamined in the framework of dynamic sec-
ond best economy populated by individuals with ination aversion. A simple
formula for the optimal ination rate is derived. Dierent from the literature,
it is shown that if the marginal excess burden of other distorting taxes ap-
proaches zero, Friedman's rule for optimum quantity of money is not optimal,
and the optimal ination tax is negative; if the marginal excess burden of oth-
er taxes is nonzero, the optimal ination rate is indeterminate and relies on
the tradeos between the impatience eect of ination and the eects of other
economic forces in the monetary economy.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The literature on the optimal ination tax1 has drawn two dierent con-
clusions roughly: the ination tax (i.e., the nominal interest rate in the
paper) should be positive or zero. In the beginning, the result of the zero
ination tax is in the rst best environment and the result of the positive
ination tax is in the second best one. In a rst best environment where
lump-sum taxes are available, Friedman (1969) proposes a monetary pol-
icy rule that generates a zero nominal interest rate, corresponding to a
zero ination tax and to a negative rate of ination. Sidrauski (1967) and
Turnovsky & Brock (1980) have also produced the result of the zero nomi-
nal interest rate in the rst best framework. And in a framework of second
best taxation, Chamley (1985a) proves that when the marginal excess bur-
den of other distorting taxes approaches zero, the model degenerates as
a rst best one, and the optimal ination tax is zero. By optimizing the
ination rate together with other distortionary taxes and exogenous factor
prices, Phelps (1973) argues that \the optimal ination tax is positive" and
Friedman's rule is unlikely to be optimal in an economy without lump-sum
taxes. Chamley (1985a) extends Phelps (1973) to a general equilibrium
model with capital and draws the same conclusion under the condition
that the marginal excess burden of other distorting taxes is nonzero. The
intuition for these studies is based on the assumption that money is a con-
sumption good. In the framework of rst best, based on the rule for the
equality of marginal benet and marginal cost, the nominal interest rate
should be zero, because the cost of supplying money is negligible. And in
the second best framework with distorting taxes, money is a consumption
good that should be taxed, just as other consumption goods, based on
the theorem of uniform taxation derived by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972).
That is, the optimal ination tax is positive, since ination is the method
of taxing cash balances by printing money.
However, many studies have proved the validity of the Friedman rule
in the framework of second best. Chari, Christiano & Kehoe (1996) and
Chari and Kehoe (1999) establish that if the utility function satises a
few simple homotheticity and separability conditions, the Friedman rule
is optimal in three standard monetary economies (a cash-credit model, a
1There are several dierent measures of the ination tax. Friedman (1948) and Bailey
(1956) identied the ination tax revenue as the rate of ination multiplied by the
real value of the (outside) quantity of money, M=p; Marty (1967, 1973) proposed to
measure the ination tax by the rate of growth of the money supply time real balances,
(+g)M=p, where g is the real growth rate; Friedman (1971) endorsed the total ination
tax as the money-supply growth rate times real balances, (

M=M)M=p; Phelps (1972,
1973) and Correia and Teles (1999) used the nominal interest rate multiplied by real
balances, ( + r)M=p, where r is the real interest rate. And the paper follows the last
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money-in-utility-function model, and a shopping time model) with distort-
ing taxes. Corriea and Teles (1996) show that the Friedman rule is the
optimal solution in those monetary models with homogeneous transactions
cost functions; furthermore, Correia and Teles (1999) argue that the Fried-
man rule is a general result in the set-up where liquidity is modeled as a
nal good. In an economy with heterogeneous agents subjecting to non-
linear taxation of labor income, Da Costa and Werning (2008) nd that
the Friedman rule is optimal when combined with a nondecreasing labor
income tax. These studies present dierent sucient conditions for the
optimality of the Friedman rule in the monetary economy with distorting
taxation, in contrast to the results of a positive ination tax derived by
Phelps (1973) and Chamley (1985a) in a second best framework. In the
paper, we draw the conclusion that the optimal ination tax is indeter-
minate, and it relies on the particular environment, just as what Siegel
(1978) had stressed the indeterminacy of the optimal tax structure in the
general equilibrium framework and what Drazen (1979) had stated that it
appeared dicult to say even whether the optimal ination rate would be
positive or negative.
In our opinion, the consistency of the literature comes from the simplied
assumption that money is just an ordinary consumption good. Actually,
money is a kind of commordity whose production is executed by governmen-
t monopolistically in most of the nations. The revenue from the creation
of money belongs to government, and the excess levy of the ination tax
would activate the printing of money rather than discourage it. Moreover,
ination is a common phenomenon closely relating to our everyday lives and
tends to impair the patience and condence of the people2. Following Zou,
Gong and Zeng (2011) and Wang and Zou (2011), the paper conceptualizes
the important phychological eect of ination as \ination aversion" and
examines its eect on the optimal ination tax. With ination aversion in
our model, we need to consider the following tradeos: (1) the cost-benet
analysis of money being a production good, (2) the eciency cost of other
distorting taxes and the impatience cost of ination, (3) the revenues of
money creation and the phychological cost of ination, (4) the utility eect
of money and the impatience eect of ination, and (5) the holdings of
money and other nancial assets. Fortunately enough, a simple formula
for the optimal ination rate is derived, even with so many tradeos. Dif-
ferent from the literature, it is shown that if the marginal excess burden of
other distorting taxes approaches zero, then Friedman's rule for optimum
quantity of money is optimal and the optimal ination tax is negative; if
the marginal excess burden of other taxes is nonzero, the sign of the nom-
2Many economists have studies the economic and phychological costs of ination, such
as Bohm-Bawerk (1891), Keynes (1936), Katona (1975), Fabricant (1976), Burns (1978),
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inal interest rate is indeterminate and relies on the particular economic
tradeos of the monetary economy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays down a second best
monetary model with ination avesion and with separablility between con-
sumption and money and it derives the main results of the paper. In
Section 3, the simple model is generalized to the case with a nonseparable
utility function. The concluding remarks are presented in section 4.
2. THE DYNAMIC MODEL WITH INFLATION AVERSION
2.1. The Model with Separable Utility Functions
Following the ination aversion concept in Zou, Zeng and Gong (2011)
and Wang and Zou (2011), it is assumed that the time preference rate of
the representative individual is a strictly increasing and concave function
of the current expected ination rate, namely,
t = (t);0(t) > 0;00(t) < 0; (1)
which imply that the patience of an individual changes with ination; and
the higher the ination, the less patient the individual is. Correspondingly,
the time discount factor of time t, t, is an implicit function of the entire





t = (t): (2)
Let us rst consider the case of the separability between consumption c,
labor l, and money m: e u(c;l;m) = U(c;l) + v(m), where both U(c;l) and
v(m) are concave The objective function of the representative individual is
Z 1
t=0
e t[U(ct;lt) + v(mt)]dt: (3)
All quantities are measured per capita. The total nancial assets of the
individual at are allocated among capital kt, bonds bt, and real money
balances mt:
at = kt + bt + mt: (4)
Output is produced with the standard neoclassical production technology
utilizing two inputs, capital kt and labor lt: yt = f(kt;lt). The gross factor
prices are determined by the marginal productivities:
rt = fk(kt;lt);wt = fl(kt;lt): (5)
Endowed with perfect foresight, the representative individual takes these
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The government nances an exogenous stream of public consumption
by a labor tax and the creation of at money. If the ow of receits and
expenditures does not coincide in the ecient solution, the government
issues or trades bonds between dierent instants at the interest rate rt.
Since there is no uncertainty, bonds are perfectly substitutable with capital
and have the same rate of return rt. In the second-best framework, the
initial level of the debt, b0; must be taken as exogenously given. Therefore,
the variations of the debt or the budget constraint of government is

bt = rtbt + gt   (wt   wt)lt   (

mt + tmt); (6)
where wt represents the net wage rate ((wt   wt) can be seen as the labor
tax rate), gt is the level of public consumption, and

mt + tmt is the
level of revenues generated by the creation of money. Setting the growth
rate of money as a constant, , we have mt = Mt
Pt and

mt = (   t)mt.
The problem of the government is to determine the policies of taxation and
ination which optimize the individual's utility subject to the government's
budget constraint and the feasibility constraint of the economy.
2.2. The Problem of Second Best
In the standard second-best problem, the policy maker has to take into
account the constraints imlied by the optimizing behavior of the private
sector. The representative individual's problem is to maximize (3), subject
to (2), (4), and his budget constraint

at = rtat + wtlt   (rt + t)mt   ct; (7)
taking frt;wt;gtg
1
t=0 and a0 as given.
To proceed, the Hamiltonian is
H = e tfU(ct;lt) + v(mt) + qt[rtat + wtlt   (rt + t)mt   ct]
 t(t) + t(at   kt   bt   mt)g;
where qt and  t are two Hamiltonian multipliers associated with the pri-
vate budget constraint and the dynamic accumulation equation of the time
discount factor, representing the marginal utility of the accumulated assets
and time discount rate, respectively; and t is the Lagrangian multiplier
associated with the stock constraint, representing the marginal value of the
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The rst-order conditions of this optimization are as follows:
Uc(ct;lt) = qt; (8)
Ul(ct;lt) =  qtwt; (9)
v0(mt) = qt(rt + t); (10)

qt = [(t)   rt]qt: (11)
The rst two equations correspond to the familiar intratemporal rst-
order conditions for consumption and leisure. The third equation deter-
mines the optimal level of cash balances, and the fourth equation is the
intertemporal condition of optimality.3
Using equations (8) and (9), c and l can be replaced as functions of q
and w:
c = c(q;w);l = l(q;w); (12)
and hence
U(c;l) = u(q;w): (13)
From equation (10), the demand for cash balances depends only on q
and the nominal interest rate i (= r + ), m =  (q;i). Since the real
interest rate r depends on the input levels k and l; and the labor supply l
is a function of q and w in (12), the demand for real money balances can
also be expressed as a function of k, q, w, and , namely,
m = (k;q;w;); (14)
which is the money demand function of the representative individual es-





plicity, it is assumed that the initial levels of the endogenous variables
P0;M0;k0;b0;q0;w0, and 0 are exogenously given.
Dierentiating equation (14) with respect to time t results in











Equation (15) shows that there is a one-to-one relation between the growth
rate of money and the ination rate in the steady state. Hence, although the




3In the following sections of the paper, whenever convenient, the time subscripts will
be omitted.
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e t fu(q;w) + v[(k;q;w;)]gdt;
subject to

k = f(k;l(q;w))   c(q;w)   g; (16)










   (k;q;w;); (17)

qt = [(t)   fk(k;l(q;w))]qt; (18)

t = (t): (19)

w = x; (20)

 = z: (21)
Equation (16) is the resource constraint of the economy, which is derived
from equations (4)-(7). Equation (17) comes from equations (5), (6), (12),
(14), and (15). Equation (18) is essentially the intertemporal optimality
condition of the private individual (11). Equations (20) and (21) are the
dynamic equations of the net wage rate and ination by denition. In the
problem, the initial values of the state variables k0;b0;q0;0;w0;0 are
exogenously given. The controls of the problem are the paths of x and z.






u(q;w) + v((k;q;w;)) + ( + k)[f(k;l(q;w))   c(q;w)   g]
 [fk(k;l(q;w))b   (fl(k;l(q;w))   w)l(q;w) + g   (k;q;w;)]





where ,  , ,  , , and  are the Hamiltonian multipliers (or co-
state variables) associated with equations (2), (16)-(21), representing the
shadow prices of the ve state variables k;b;q;;w, and , respectively.
The variable  represents the social marginal value of the unique good in
the economy. In the second-best problem,  is in general dierent from
the private marginal value of the good, q. The variable   represents the
social marginal value of the public debt, which is also equal to the marginal
excess burden of taxation. It is assumed that there is a unique dynamic
path which satises the optimality conditions of the second best problem
and converges to a steady state.5
5The proof of stability of the steady state is very complex, but similiar to Chamley
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2.3. The Optimal Ination Tax
Among those dynamic equations which dene implicitly the optimal so-
lution to the problem of second best, four of them characterizes more specif-
ically the optimal ination rate:
z : Hz = e t( + ) = 0; (22)
k : Hk =  
d
dt
(e t) = (t)e t + e t

; (23)
b : Hb =  
d
dt
(e t) = (t)e t + e t 
; (24)
 : H =  
d
dt
(e t) = (t)e t + e t

: (25)
Equation (22) leads to














Equation (24) gives rise to

 = [()   fk(k;l(q;w))]: (28)
Together with equation (18), equation (28) shows that the marginal ex-






Substituting equations (10), (26), (27) and (28) into equation (25) results
in
q(r + ) + m + ( + q)0()q   0() =  (r + ): (30)
Multiplying both sides of equation (30) by   1








[q( + q)   ]0()

; 6 (31)










6If 0() = 0 in equation (30) or (32), it is the Chamley (1985a) model.INFLATION AVERSION AND THE OPTIMAL INFLATION TAX 21











[(1 + v)(r + )k   vfkkb + vflkl   qfkk]: (32)
Substituting equation (32), flkl + fkkk = 07, and 0()k = fkk
8 into
equation (30), rearranging, we obtain the simple formula that determines













where ! = m
k+b+m is the share of money in total nancial wealth in the
steady state. Equation (33) establishes
Proposition 1. In the dynamic second best economy populated by in-
dividuals with ination aversion, the optimal ination rate is determined
by formula (33). If the marginal excess burden of other distorting taxes is
zero, i.e., v = 0 (or  = 0), then Friedman's rule for optimum quantity of
money is not optimal.
Similiar to Chamley (1985a), a simple rule for the optimal ination rate
is derived. Dierent from Chamley (1985a), two new items emerge in the
formula: one is the share of money in the total wealth, the other is the
\ination aversion". The formula involves more economic factors than the
literature.
If the marginal excess burden of other distorting taxes approaches zero,
the second-best problem degenerates to the rst-best problem. Friedman
(1969), Sidrauski (1967), and Chamley (1985a) show that when lump-sum
taxation is feasible, or, the marginal excess burden of other distorting
taxation is zero, i.e., v = 0, the nominal interest rate is equal to zero
(i = r +  = 0) and hence the Friedman rule is optimal. Dierent from





which is not equal to zero. Although the marginal excess burden of other
taxes is very small, the Friedman rule is still not optimal. Moreover, the
7This equation comes from the property of constant return to scale of the production
function.
8In the steady state, this equation holds. The proof is in appendix A.22 GAOWANG WANG AND HENG-FU ZOU
negative nominal interest rate shows that the optimal ination tax is nega-
tive. That is to say, the government should subsidy the individuals for their
holdings of money. In other words, the optimal monetary policy is deating
more deeply than Friedman's rule, which can be seen from the transforma-
tion of formula (34), namely,  =  [r  

0()
2q ] <  r.9 In order to show
the reason, by setting r0 = r +
 
0()
2qm , we have r0 > r, f0(k0) > f0(k), and
hence k0 < k, for the strict concavity of the production function. Then, the
logic is clear. With the decreasing patience for ination aversion, individ-
uals consume more and save less. Hence, the steady-state levels of capital
and consumption will be decreased in the long run, and the long-run level
of the real interest rate will be higher, [r  

0()
2q ] > r. Therefore, the




2q ] <  r.
Proposition 2. If the marginal excess burden of other distorting taxes
is nite, i.e., v 2 (0;1), then the optimal ination tax is indeterminate.
Specically,




qm]0(), the optimal ination tax is positive, i.e.,
i > 0;




qm]0(), the optimal ination tax is negative, i.e.,
i < 0;




qm]0(), the optimal ination tax is zero, i.e.,
i = 0.
The proof of the proposition is straightforward. However, it provides
a more general framework than the literature, in which the sign of the
nominal interest rate is indeterminate. First of all, if the marginal excess
burden of other distorting taxes is larger than the impatience eect of




qm]0(), then the nominal interest rate (or
the ination tax) is positive, i.e., i > 0. This positive nominal interest rate
result is consistent with Phelps (1973) and Chamley (1985a). However,
in our opinion, a better explanation for the positive ination tax could
be stated: it is the tradeo between two dierent kinds of distorting taxes
(the ination tax and the income tax) by the government, which determines
the positive ination tax, rather than the theorem of uniform commordity
taxation. In order to decrease the distortions from income taxation, the
government levies an ination tax to some degree. Correspondingly, the
optimal ination rate or optimal monetary growth rate is larger than the
negative value of the time preference rate in the steady state,  =  r +
9Totally dierentiating equation (10) gives rise to dm
dk =
qf00(k)
v00(m)  0, and dm
d =
q
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m"
  >  , since the equilibrium time preference rate is equal to the real
interest rate in the steady state. In particular, if r = m"
 , the optimal
ination rate could be zero or positive. Secondly, if the marginal excess
burden of other distorting taxes is equal to the impatience eect of ination,




qm]0(), then the nominal interest rate is zero, i = 0.
That is to say, when these two opposite eects are balanced, Friedman's
rule for optimum quantity of money is optimal. Compared to Phelps (1973)
and Chamley (1985a), the positive ination tax on money is osetted by
the negative eect of ination. Hence, the optimal ination tax is zero in
our model. Finally, if the marginal excess burden of other distorting taxes





then the nominal interest rate is negative, i.e., i < 0. That is, compared
to the distorting eects of other taxes, the dominating impatience eect of
ination determines in the end that if government prints too much papers,
it is optimal for government to subsidize the consumers for their holdings
of money, i.e., i < 0. Then, the optimal strategy of the government is to
reduce the supply of money even more than Friedman's rule. Hence, the
optimal ination rate is less than the negative value of the time preference
rate  =  r + m"
  <  . Therefore, the result derived in Proposition 1
can be looked upon as an example of Proposition 2.
Proposition 3. Assume that the excess burden of other distorting taxes
approaches innite, i.e., v ! 1, and the impatience eect of ination is
nite, i.e.,

qm0() < 1. Then,
(i) if !
1 ! > 0(), the optimal ination tax is positive, i.e., i > 0;
(ii) if !
1 ! < 0(), the optimal ination tax is negative, i.e., i < 0;
(iii) if !
1 ! = 0(), the optimal ination tax is zero. Especially, if
! = 1
2, and the time preference function is ane, i.e., () =  +a, where
a is an arbitrary constant, then the optimal ination tax is zero. Hence,
Friedman's rule for optimum quantity of money is optimal.
Proof. The proof is in appendix B.
It is dened that ! is the proportion of money in total nancial assets
in the steady state, i.e., ! = m
k+b+m. It is appropriate to think of ! as
the relative demand for money, 1   ! as the relative demand for other
nancial assets, and hence !
1 ! as the optimal ratio of the proportions of
money and other nancial assets in total nonhuman wealth. Since money
is in utility and Um > 0, the level of !
1 ! can be looked upon as the utility
eect of money. And the higher level of !
1 ! stands for a higher demand for
money and a stronger utility eect of money. Natually, 0() stands for the
impatience eect of ination. Then, it is easy to explain the proposition.
If the utility eect of money dominates the impatience eect of in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i.e., !
1 ! > 0(), then the nominal interest rate is positive, i > 0. That
is, if the impatience eet is small and the utility of money is large, it is
optimal for government to levy a positive ination tax. To see this, setting
r0 = r + 1
[1   1 !
! 0()] < r, we have r0 < r, f0(k0) < f(k), and k0 > k.
Since the impatience eect of ination is dominated by the utility eect of
money, the demand for money increases. And more capital is accumulated
since money and capital move in the same direction on the optimal path.10
Correspondingly, the optimal ination rate is larger than the rate argued
by Friedman and might be zero or positive. On the other hand, if the
utility eect of money is dominated by the impatience eect of ination,
i.e., !
1 ! < 0(), the nominal interest rate is negative, i < 0. In this case,
the steady state levels of real balances and capital are both decreased. It
is optimal for government to subsidize the consumers for their holdings of
money. Hence, the optimal ination tax is negative. Finally, if these two
eects oset each other, the nominal interest rate is zero and the Friedman
rule is optimal.
Two particular cases are presented as follows. Case 1, if the time pref-
erence function is ane, or 0() = 1, and the share of money in the total
nancial wealth is one half in the steady state, i.e., ! = 1
2, the Friedman
rule is optimal, for i = r +  = 0. Case 2, if the share of money in total
nancial wealth is one in the steady state, i.e., ! = 1 and the impatience
eect of ination is nite,

qm0() < 1, we have " = 1
2 by taking the limits
on the both sides of equation (33) with respect to v. It is similiar to Bailey
(1956) and Chamley (1985a), which shows that when the excess burden of
other taxes tends to innity, the governemnt maximizes the revenues from
money creation and " is equal to one.11
3. GENERALIZATIONS TO NON-SEPARABLE UTILITY
FUNCTION
The assumption of additive separability was introduced in the previous
section for the sake of simplicity. It is now relaxed to the general concave
function, U = U(c;l;m). Then, the optimality conditions of the represen-
10See note 9.
11The issue of time-consistency is similar to Chamley (1985a). If assuming that q0 and
P0 are exogenously given and that the government is honest in the sense of Auerheimer
(1974), it can be shown that there is no incentive for the government to change w0, 0.INFLATION AVERSION AND THE OPTIMAL INFLATION TAX 25
tative individual are
Uc(ct;lt;mt) = qt; (35)
Ul(ct;lt;mt) =  qtwt; (36)
Um(ct;lt;mt) = qt(rt + t); (37)

qt = [(t)   rt]qt: (38)
From equations (35) and (36), consumption and labor supply can be
expressed as functions of qt;wt; and mt:
ct = c(qt;wt;mt);lt = l(qt;wt;mt): (39)
Then, the optimality conditions of the rm turn into
rt = fk(kt;l(qt;wt;mt));wt = fl(kt;l(qt;wt;mt)): (40)
Substituting equations (39) and (40) into equation (37) gives us the mon-
ey demand function, implicitly dened as a function of kt;qt;wt; and t,
i.e., m = (k;q;w;). Taking derivatives with respect to t on both sides











Similiar to the case of additively separable utility, the Hamiltonian asso-




> > > <
> > > :




[fl(k;l(q;w;(k;q;w;)))   w]l(q;w;(k;q;w;)) + g   
)
( + q)[()   fk(k;l(q;w;(k;q;w;)))]qt + ( + w)x + ( + )z   (t)
9
> > > =




The optimality conditions on the control variable z and the state variable
b are analogous to the results of the case with separable utility function
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 = x = z = 0), the
optimality conditions on the state variables  and k turn into
A + m   0(t) = q( + q)[fkllm   0()]; (46)
and
kA   (fkkb   flkl) = q( + q)[fkk + fkllmk]; (47)
respectively, where
A = fum + (r + ) + ( + k)(wlm   cm)   lm[fklb   flll   (w   w)]g:
Dividing equation (47) by equation (46) on both sides leads to
kA   (fkkb   flkl)





which is equivalent to
fkk(A + m) + mfkllmk + (fkkb   flkl)fkllm (48)
+0()f[kA   (fkkb   flkl)]   (fkk + fkllmk)g = 0:
The property of constant return to scale of the production function re-
sults in
fkll + fkkk = 0;flll + flkk = 0: (49)
Equations (35)-(37) and (42) establish
qcm   qwlm + q(r + ) = um: (50)
From equations (48), (49), and (50), it is easy to derive the formula for





























f(   q + 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Thus, we have
Proposition 4. In the framework of second best taxation with ination
aversion and nonseparable utility, the rule for the optimal ination rate is
given by equation (51). Similiar to the separable utility case, if the marginal
eciency cost of other distorting taxation is nite, i.e., v < 1, the Fried-
man rule is not optimal, even the marginal eciency cost of other taxes is
zero.12
4. CONCLUSION
The paper has analyzed the problem of the optimal ination tax in a
stylized dynamic model of second best with ination aversion and derived
interesting results dierent from the literature. The three propositions
of section 2 present the main results. Firstly, when the marginal excess
burden of other distortion taxes approaches zero, the paper shows that the
optimal ination tax is negative and Friedman's rule for optimum quantity
of money is not optimal. Secondly, when the marginal excess burden of
other distorting taxes is nite, the sign of the nominal interest rate relies
mainly on the tradeo of the marginal excess burden of other distorting
taxes and the impatience eect of ination. Specically, if the marginal
excess burden of other taxes dominates, then the nominal interest rate is
positive; if the impatience eect of ination dominates, then the nominal
interest rate is negative; and if the two opposite eects oset each other,
then the nominal interest rate is zero. Thirdly, when the marginal excess
burden of other distorting taxes approaches innite and the impatience
eect is nite, the optimal ination tax depends mainly on the tradeos
between the utility eect of money and the impatience eect of ination.
If the utility eect of money dominates, the ination tax is positive; if the
impatience eect of ination dominates, the ination tax is negative; and
if these two eects equal, then the ination tax is zero.
APPENDIX A
Proof: Totally dierentiating equation m = (k;q;w;) gives rise to
dm = kdk + qdq + wdw + d;
12When v = 0, equation (51) is simplied to " =  0()(1 +
)f[1 + 0()=fkk]Bg
 1 6= 0. Hence, dierent from Chamley (1985a), the Friedman
rule is not optimal. But, if ination aversion does not exit, i.e., 0() = 0, we return to
the simple rule derived by Chamley (1985a), i.e., " =
v(1+)
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which implies that dm
dk = k, dm







Totally dierentiating equation () = r = fk(k;l(q;w)) in the steady
state results in








Then, equations (A.1) and (A.2) establish fkk = 0()k.
APPENDIX B

































Then, when the marginal excess burden of other distorting taxes approach-





2 . By the denition of the interest elasticity of the money
demand, we have







where the item of ( 2) is positive from note 9. Hence,
If 1 > 1 !
! 0(), i.e., !
1 ! > 0(), then i > 0, and  =  r   1
2[1  
1 !
! 0()] >  r;
If 1 < 1 !
! 0(), i.e., !
1 ! < 0(), then i < 0, and  =  r   1
2[1  
1 !
! 0()] <  r;
If 1 = 1 !
! 0(), i.e., !
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In particular, putting ! = 1
2 and 0() = 1 into equation (B.1) yields
i = 0.
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